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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

REHNQUIST’S COURT
RICHARD J. LAZARUS*

I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Tom Merrill is, without a doubt, one of the keenest academic
observers of the Supreme Court. Merrill’s scholarly analysis of the Court is
invariably insightful, accurately spotting long term implications of the Court’s
decisions long before they are readily apparent, even perhaps to the Justices
who produced them.1 His Childress Lecture, is not surprisingly, therefore, a
tour de force in its thoughtful assessment of various political science theories
of judicial decision making to explain the ways in which the Rehnquist Court’s
jurisprudential focus has shifted over time.2 Merrill’s thesis that there have
been two Rehnquist Courts and that the current stability of the Court’s
membership may have played a role in both the Court’s shift away from social
issues and towards a federalism agenda is characteristically original, creative,
and provocative.
At the end of the day, however, I find Merrill’s thesis unpersuasive. I do
not share his view that it is especially enlightening to treat the current Chief
Justice’s tenure as divided into two distinct Rehnquist Courts: one before and
one after the stabilization that has occurred in the Court’s membership since
1994. Nor do I believe that the remarkable stability in the membership of the
current Court, while certainly significant in other ways, has played any special
role in shifting the Court’s agenda away from social issues and towards a
greater focus on federalism matters. In fact, I am not even persuaded that such
a meaningful shift in focus has occurred. Finally, I likewise question the
validity of Merrill’s claim that any such shift resulted because of a strategic
decision by Justice Scalia to steer the Court towards topics on which a
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks are owed to Dalena Marcott and
Kelly Moser, both Georgetown University Law Center Class of 2004, for their excellent research
assistance, and to Mark Tushnet who commented on an earlier draft.
1. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the
Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill &
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial
Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992).
2. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A
Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569 (2003).
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conservative majority could more consistently prevail. Indeed, Justice Scalia’s
conduct on the Court is more remarkable for the lack of the kind of strategic
behavior that might have fostered the stability of a conservative majority on
the Court. Rather than strengthen the reciprocal relations between those
Justices, Justice Scalia has weakened them, thereby undermining the kind of
trust necessary to forge enduring coalitions in a multi-member court.
This commentary on Professor Merrill’s Childress Lecture, accordingly,
takes issue with three of his primary arguments. Part II considers the accuracy
of Merrill’s assertion that the Rehnquist Court can be meaningfully divided
into his proffered two periods based on the stability of the Court’s
membership. Part III questions Merrill’s contention that the Court made a
concerted move away from social issues in the so-called second Rehnquist
Court. Finally, Part IV contests Merrill’s claim that Justice Scalia is somehow
responsible, based on his strategic behavior, for the success that the current
five-Justice majority is having on the Court on matters relating to structural
issues, such as federalism.
II. THE ONE AND ONLY REHNQUIST
The Court’s shift to structural issues in recent years is not so much
evidence of the existence of two distinct “Rehnquist Courts” as it is the
evidence of the even more remarkable fact that, for more than three decades,
there has been only one Rehnquist. First Justice, now Chief Justice Rehnquist
has proven to be the counterexample to the oft-repeated lore that one cannot
accurately predict how any person, once on the Court, will actually evolve in
his or her views over time.3 History is notoriously littered with Presidents who
have been unpleasantly surprised by the subsequent votes of Justices whom
they nominated for the Court. Liberal Presidents nominate reputed liberal
jurists and lawyers, who seem to evolve into judicial conservatives over time.
Likewise, more conservative Presidents nominate conservative jurists and
lawyers who, upon their ascension, vote in ways wholly antithetical to “their”
President. Frequently-cited examples in recent decades include President
Eisenhower and both Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan; President
Kennedy and Justice White; President Nixon and Justice Blackmun; President
Ford and Justice Stevens; and, more recently, President George H. W. Bush
and Justice Souter.

3. See, e.g., Ed R. Haden, Judicial Selection: A Pragmatic Approach, 24 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 531, 536-38 (2001) (“picking Justices based on politics alone can cause problems—
many Justices who were nominated for political reasons eventually harmed the presidents who
nominated them”); Stephen B. Presser, Should Ideology of Judicial Nominees Matter?: Is the
Senate’s Current Reconsideration of the Confirmation Process Justified?, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
245, 258 (2001) (“predictions of what people will do when they ascend the bench are notoriously
inaccurate”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

REHNQUIST’S COURT

863

With Chief Justice Rehnquist, by contrast, President Nixon obtained just
what he wanted: a stalwart, reliable, no-nonsense vote on the Court that
reflected both the President’s views on criminal justice as well as his views on
federalism. The President generally favored a smaller federal government,
returning much of the authority of the ever-expanding federal bureaucracy over
social programs to the States.4 As well chronicled, Nixon nominated
Rehnquist to the Court in the fall of 1971 only after several other better known
candidates failed to garner sufficient support either from key members of
Congress or within the President’s own circle of advisors;5 other candidates,
like then-Senator Howard Baker of Tennessee, simply delayed too long in
responding to the President’s early entreaties.6 Nixon ultimately opted in favor
of the then-virtually unknown Rehnquist, who was serving as an Assistant
Attorney General under Attorney General John Mitchell, because he was
impressed by Rehnquist’s staunch constitutional conservatism and outstanding
academic credentials.7 Also very important to Nixon was Rehnquist’s
youthfulness: He was only forty-seven years old. As Nixon presciently
observed at the time, “he was appointing ‘a guy who’s there 30 years. And
who, also, if a Republican is around, is a potential candidate for chief
justice.’”8 President Nixon also plainly enjoyed the sheer surprise of the
Rehnquist choice.9
Soon after joining the Court, moreover, then-Justice Rehnquist left little
doubt that structural and federalism issues were high on his personal agenda.10
He authored the Court’s opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery,11 which
elevated the Tenth Amendment as a primary constitutional basis for limiting
the federal government’s authority to intrude upon state sovereignty. Even
though overruled a few years later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,12 National League of Cities has remained strikingly
influential. At the very least, notwithstanding its formal overruling, National
4. Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism—An American
Tradition: Modern Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 288
(1996) (“‘It is time for a New Federalism in which power, funds, and responsibility will flow
from Washington to the states and to the people.’” (quoting President Richard Nixon)); see
generally TIMOTHY CONLAN, NEW FEDERALISM: INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM FROM NIXON
TO REAGAN (1988).
5. See generally JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE
NIXON APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT (2001); Fred P. Graham, Nixon’s
Choices: Why He Apparently Made a Last-Minute Switch, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1971, § 4, at 1.
6. DEAN, supra note 5, at 221-40, 246.
7. Id. at 228-34, 245-46.
8. Id. at 265 (quoting President Richard Nixon).
9. Id. at 250-51, 264.
10. See SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 135-88 (1989).
11. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
12. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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League of Cities plainly invigorated the Tenth Amendment by prompting
academics, the legal profession, and, ultimately, the Court to reconsider and
reassert federalism issues in a host of subsequent rulings.13
Rehnquist, similarly, early on made clear his view that congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause should be more narrowly construed than
had been the Court’s practice.14 In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Control
& Reclamation Ass’n, Inc.,15 he filed a concurring opinion that presaged by
nearly two decades the Court’s 1995 opinion in United States v. Lopez.16
Rehnquist took issue with the majority opinion, contending that congressional
Commerce Clause authority existed only if there was a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.17 After describing the Court’s recent Commerce Clause
precedent, Rehnquist further cautioned that “[d]espite the holdings of these
cases, and the broad dicta often contained therein, there are constitutional
limits on the power of Congress to regulate pursuant to the Commerce
Clause.”18 The Justice expressly cautioned against undue deference to
congressional determinations that a particular subject was sufficiently linked to
interstate commerce to fall within the legislature’s Commerce Clause
authority: “[S]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity
substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so.”19
Rehnquist’s early Eleventh Amendment precedent similarly laid the
groundwork for the Court’s dramatic resurgence of that Amendment during the
past few years. Soon after joining the Court, a then-very junior Justice
Rehnquist took a leadership role by authoring the Court’s significant Eleventh
Amendment ruling in Edelman v. Jordan.20 The Edelman Court ruled that,
absent state consent, the Eleventh Amendment barred a suit by private parties
seeking to impose liability payable from public funds in the state treasury
based upon the state’s violation of a federal assistance program for the aged,
blind, and disabled.21 Even two years later, in writing the opinion for the Court
in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,22 which upheld congressional authority to abrogate a
state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity when Congress enacts legislation
13. Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court’s Federalism
Offensive, 51 DUKE. L.J. 477, 503 (2001).
14. Rehnquist also argued, albeit in dissent, that the Court should be less ready to invoke the
dormant Commerce Clause as a constitutional ground for overturning state regulations and taxes
based on their purported adverse impact on interstate commerce. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
15. 452 U.S. 264, 308 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
16. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
17. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 310-11 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 309.
19. Id. at 311.
20. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
21. Id. at 662-63.
22. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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pursuant to its Section 5 enforcement authority under the Fourteenth
Amendment, Rehnquist was careful not to endorse the broader view that
Congress possessed such abrogation authority under the Commerce Clause.
The negative implication of that narrow opinion was realized twenty years later
in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,23 when the Court held that Congress
lacked such authority under the Commerce Clause, overruling prior precedent
from which Rehnquist had dissented.24 Not surprisingly, Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote the Court’s opinion in Seminole Tribe. Since then, he has also
written opinions for the Court rejecting arguments that specific federal laws
constitute valid exercises of congressional authority to abrogate state Eleventh
Amendment immunity pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.25
The Court’s recent shift, if any, to structural issues simply reflects the
longstanding interests of the Chief Justice. It was not prompted, moreover, by
the stability of the Court’s membership since Justice Breyer joined the Court in
1994 or even, as Professor Merrill alternatively dates it, “the replacement of
Justice White by Justice Thomas, which was completed when White retired in
1993.”26 Instead, it can be far more easily dated to the time that Justice
Thomas replaced Justice Marshall on the Court. As soon as Justice Thomas
joined the Court in 1991, the Chief Justice had, for the first time since he
joined the Court in 1971, a five-Justice majority on many of the structural
issues that had long been one of his primary concerns. Merrill is correct that
the Chief had been denied that majority before then because of Justice White;
Justice White’s conservative tendencies on law and order and some social
issues did not extend to those structural issues, because White favored a strong
federal government.27 Justice White had not been the Chief’s ally on structural
matters such as the scope of congressional Commerce Clause authority, Tenth
Amendment limitations on federal interference with state sovereignty, or State
Eleventh Amendment immunity. With Justice Marshall’s departure, however,
the Chief no longer needed Justice White’s vote.
For that same reason, the relative stability of the Court since Justice
Breyer’s appointment has been largely beside the point.28 What has mattered
23. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
24. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
25. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
26. Merrill, supra note 2, at 593.
27. See generally DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE
(1998); Kate Stith, Byron R. White, Last of the New Deal Liberals, 103 YALE L. J. 19, 21-22
(1993).
28. The impact on the Court’s decision making of any stabilization of its membership could
not, in any event, fairly be measured by the Court’s precedent immediately after Breyer joined the
Court in 1994. Presumably, it takes at least four to five years for the Justices to realize that their
membership has stabilized. If so, it is only during just the past two or three years and in the
future that any such stabilization effect could be observed.
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for the Chief has been the stability of the five Justices that comprise his
conservative majority; that the other four have also been stable since 1994 is
neither here nor there. There is no reason to suppose, for instance, that the
Court’s decisions would have been any different had Justice Stevens retired
from the Court after 1994 and been replaced by a Justice named by President
Clinton.
In sum, the Court’s resurgent focus on structural issues is most likely
simply an expression of the longstanding interest of the current Chief, rather
than any strategic calculation by Justice Scalia. The reason, moreover, that the
Chief has been so successful in recent years is not because the Court as a
whole has been stable, but because the Chief’s five-Justice majority has been
stable ever since Justice Thomas joined the Court. The Chief may well be one
of the relatively few Justices who is, in fact, best explained by the more often
than not dubious “attitudinal model,” described in Merrill’s article.29 The
Chief has his own unique, sometimes quite blunt style.30 He perceives answers
to legal issues clearly and quickly, as evidenced by his “ten-day rule,” which
requires his law clerks to provide him with a draft opinion within ten days of
the opinion assignment.31 For Rehnquist, there is no particular moment for
angst or the wringing of hands in judicial decision making. Nor is there
anything remotely Machiavellian about him. He is straightforward and direct
in his analysis and in his dealings with others. The Chief knows what he
believes the law is (or should be) and steadfastly seeks to move the Court’s
precedent in that direction.
The key to understanding the Court’s seeming shift towards structural
issues, therefore, lies largely in Rehnquist’s sheer, unbending persistence in
pursuing those issues for over thirty years. As described by one interviewer,
Rehnquist “is directed in his opinions not so much by stare decisis, past
judicial decisions, as by an inner compass that almost unfailingly evolved from
a moral vision developed long ago.”32 Or as my colleague, Mark Tushnet,
even more succinctly put it: Rehnquist has been “an almost perfect Republican
Chief Justice.”33
III. THE ABSENCE OF ANY SHIFT AWAY FROM SOCIAL ISSUES
Even more questionable, however, is Professor Merrill’s premise that the
Rehnquist Court has undertaken a “shift away from . . . high-profile social
29. Merrill, supra note 2, at 590-91.
30. See Linda Greenhouse, Supremely Sheltered, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1993, § 6 (Magazine),
at 84.
31. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 298 (1987).
32. John A. Jenkins, The Partisan: A Talk With Justice Rehnquist, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,
1985, § 6 (Magazine), at 31.
33. Mark V. Tushnet, A Republican Chief Justice, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1326, 1334 (1990)
(reviewing SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989)).
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issues,”34 as well as his accompanying explanation that the “hazing” suffered
by Justice Thomas during his Senate confirmation may have caused the
Justices to worry about the adverse impacts of being too much in the public
eye.35 Merrill’s mistake lies in too narrowly defining what constitutes a highprofile social issue, placing too much emphasis on the abortion and affirmative
action issues as bellwethers of the Court’s willingness to take on such issues
notwithstanding their associated political controversy. Merrill also relies
unduly on quantitative rather than qualitative analysis in considering the
character of the Court’s docket. Indeed, a both broader and more qualitative
analysis of the Court’s docket suggests that the current Court has been
anything but shy in its willingness to take on social controversy. The Court
has been ever ready and willing (whether or not able) to address some of the
most politically controversial social issues of the day.
The Court’s docket has, for instance, recently included a series of highprofile controversies associated with the Religion Clauses. The Court’s
decision last Term in the school voucher case, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,36
put the Court at the fulcrum of one of the nation’s most contentious social
debates. So, too, did the Court’s ruling a few years ago in Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe,37 involving the constitutionality of
student-led prayer during half-time at a public school football game in Texas.
These are not isolated counterexamples.
The Court has recently
considered the validity of federal tobacco regulation,38 the constitutionality of
drug testing in public high schools,39 government classifications based on
sexual orientation,40 prohibitions on child pornography,41 restrictions on cross
burning,42 and limitations on grandparent visitation rights,43 all of which
similarly involved high-profile social issues that placed the Court directly in
the political spotlight.
The Court’s death penalty cases are to similar effect. Next to abortion and
affirmative action, perhaps no issue has so divided public opinion as has the
death penalty; yet the Supreme Court has here too repeatedly displayed its
willingness to consider a host of death penalty issues, most recently the
34. Merrill, supra note 2, at 576.
35. Id. at 630-31.
36. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
37. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
38. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
39. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
40. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
41. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844 (1997); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
42. See Virginia v. Black, 553 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 2288 (2002)
(mem.).
43. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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constitutionality of its application to the mentally retarded.44 Another case,
raising the question of the constitutionality of the electric chair, was before the
Court, but not decided on the merits only because the State of Florida rendered
the case moot by changing its own law.45 For the purposes of considering
Merrill’s thesis, it is significant that the Court voluntarily accepted review of
that legal issue, notwithstanding its clear tendency to inject the Court in the
midst of a hot topic of ongoing public debate.
While Merrill is certainly correct that the Court had, until recently,
displayed surprising reticence to grant review of certain high-profile
affirmative action cases, most notably those arising out of the admissions
policies of public universities,46 the Court’s reluctance in that respect is
ultimately fairly narrowly drawn. During this same time-frame, the Court had
entertained a strikingly high number of high-profile civil rights issues
involving the disabled,47 closely supervised the constitutionality of state
congressional redistricting,48 considered the constitutionality of a state ban on
physician-assisted suicide,49 and willingly entered the fray by considering the
constitutionality of the Commonwealth of Virginia’s refusal to admit women
to the Virginia Military Institute.50 Similarly, on the abortion issue, the Court
did not shy away from considering the constitutionality of Nebraska’s
restriction on so-called “partial birth abortions,” notwithstanding its potential
to create deep emotional wounds on the Court in the full glare of the national
news media.51 Also, any relative aversion to the abortion issue that the current
Court may harbor has not prevented it from considering a host of claims
relating to the legality of restrictions placed on abortion protestors.52

44. See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002).
45. See Bryan v. Moore, 528 U.S. 1133 (2000).
46. See Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law School, 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
532 U.S. 1051 (2001); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S.
1033 (1996). However, the Court granted review in a Sixth Circuit case presenting just such
contentious affirmative action issues arising out of a challenge to the University of Michigan’s
admissions policies. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S.
Ct. 617 (2002).
47. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002); US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,
535 U.S. 391 (2002); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); PGA Tour,
Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
48. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Bush v.
Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); Easley v. Cromartie, 532
U.S. 234 (2001).
49. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
50. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
51. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
52. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Scheidler v. NOW, Inc., 535 U.S. 1016
(2002) (mem.) (consolidated for oral argument); Operation Rescue v. NOW, Inc., 535 U.S. 1016
(2002) (mem.) (consolidated for oral argument).
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Finally, one would seem hard-pressed to characterize as shy in any respect
a Court that voluntarily entered into the political imbroglio arising out of the
Florida vote-counting debacle in the 2000 Presidential election. As described
by Professor Laurence Tribe, “not one major constitutional scholar . . .
predicted before the Court granted certiorari on November 24 that it would
intervene. We were all positive that the Court would sit this one out. . . . [T]he
Justices took their ‘unsought responsibility’ to a new level . . . .”53
In sum, a qualitative assessment of the Court’s docket since its
membership has stabilized casts significant doubt on the accuracy of Merrill’s
premise that a more stable Court has moved away from high-profile, socially
controversial issues. Not only has the Court exhibited no such tendencies, but
it might even be more accurate to contend that the Court has been more willing
than ever to take on such issues. Whatever hazing individual members of the
Court may or may not feel Justice Thomas received during his confirmation,
they have since shown little reluctance to subject themselves to political debate
and discussion, at least on topics related to their work on the Court.
IV. SCALIA’S JUDICIAL REACTANCE
Finally, Professor Merrill suggests that the Court’s agenda shift may have
resulted from a strategic decision by Justice Scalia to steer the Court away
from social issues, about which the conservative majority could not agree, to
structural issues, about which a more enduring majority could persist.54
Having already questioned above the accuracy of Merrill’s premise, I now
want to question the accuracy of his speculation that Justice Scalia may have
served such a strategic function in any event. For those academic observers of
the Court and legal practitioners before the Court who are fans of Justice
Scalia, many favorable adjectives would come to mind in describing Justice
Scalia’s performance on the Court, including brilliant, clever, quick, rigorous,
demanding, principled and eloquent. “Strategic,” however, could not fairly be
among those adjectives.
The essence of a strategic Justice is one who is capable of forging majority
coalitions, especially those that can endure over time and, therefore, of
producing a coherent body of jurisprudence rather than an isolated ruling that
is more susceptible to subsequent diminishment. Justices Black and Brennan
are two frequently cited examples of Justices known for such majority
coalition-building skills.55 Scalia, in contrast, could be more accurately
characterized as the paradigmatic example of the anti-strategic Justice.
53. Laurence H. Tribe, eroG .v hsuB and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its Hall
of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 299 (2001) (emphasis added).
54. Merrill, supra note 2, at 604-09.
55. See Akhil Reed Amar, Hugo Black and the Hall of Fame, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1221, 1241
(2002); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Art of Judicial Biography, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1595, 1611
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To be sure, Professor Merrill is certainly correct that “stability over a long
period of time” can mean a “majority coalition enjoys stronger cohesion than
one would expect” than if there were instead turnover in membership.56 He is
further correct in contending that such stability in membership can promote the
formation of “[d]ense bonds of reciprocity” among the conservative Justices on
the Court.57 However, what Merrill has not paid adequate attention to is the
possibility for just the opposite to occur over time. People in small, stable
groups engaged in collaborative decision making can also grow apart,
undermining cooperation and eroding reciprocity.
Trust does not necessarily build over time. Scholars expert on the
psychology of group decision making instead recognize that “trust between
two or more interdependent actors thickens or thins as a function of their
cumulative interaction.
Interactional histories give decision makers
information that is useful in assessing others’ dispositions, intentions, and
motives.”58 Thus, while Merrill is right that reciprocity can build trust, it is
equally true that “the absence or violation of reciprocity erodes it.”59 Indeed,
trust is particularly difficult to maintain over time because trust is easier to
destroy than it is to build. This is both because “negative (trust destroying)
events are more visible and noticeable than positive (trust building) events”
and because “trust-destroying events carry more weight in judgment than trustbuilding events of comparable magnitude.”60
As applied to collaborative judicial decision making, the formal
psychological phenomenon is termed reactance, which finds its roots in
physics, where reactance refers to an oppositional force that electronic
components exhibit to the passage of alternating current. In psychology,
reactance refers to the phenomenon of someone reacting so negatively to
external pressure to act in a certain way that he or she may tend to do the
opposite.61 For instance, such a “boomerang effect” may occur “when a
clumsy attempt to pressure an individual into adopting a particular behavior
(1995) (reviewing ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY (1994)); HUNTER R.
CLARK, JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE GREAT CONCILIATOR (1995).
56. Merrill, supra note 2, at 649.
57. Id. at 651.
58. Roderick M. Kramer, Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Emerging Perspectives,
Enduring Questions, 50 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 569, 575 (1999) (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 575-76 (citing Morton Deutsch, Trust and Suspicion, 2 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 265
(1958)); see also IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY
DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 263 (2d ed. 1982) (describing adverse effects on group consensus
decision-making of open criticism of group members).
60. Kramer, supra note 58, at 593 (citing Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust, and
Democracy, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 675 (1993)).
61. See generally JACK W. BREHM, A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE (Leon
Festinger & Stanley Schachter eds., 1966); ROBERT A. WICKLUND, FREEDOM AND REACTANCE
(1974).
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leads him to choose the opposite course.”62 Some studies even suggest that a
boomerang effect is significantly more pronounced when the individual who is
the intended object of influence was initially in agreement rather than in
disagreement with the position being communicated.63
In the current Supreme Court, there is more basis for speculating that
Justice Scalia has undermined the stability of the Court’s conservative majority
than there is reason to suppose (as Professor Merrill does) the converse.
Justice Scalia writes passionately, artfully, and sharply. His wit is often barbed
and his criticism scathing. He also tends to aim his sharpest and most vocal
denunciations not at those more liberal members on the Court with whom he
disagrees routinely, but instead at those more conservative members of the
Court whenever they fail to live up to Scalia’s own conservative standards. He
openly ridicules their legal reasoning, casts doubt on their morality, and even
sometimes appears to call into question both their intellectual capacity and
personal integrity.64 Supreme Court Justices must, of course, have thick skins

62. IRVING L. JANIS & LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT 256-57 (1985); see WICKLUND, supra note 61, at 4
(“The more a person feels pushed in a given direction, the more reactance will move him in the
opposite direction.”); Carl I. Hovland, et al., Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Reactions to
Communication and Attitude Change, 55 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 244, 244 (1957)
(“Attempts to change attitudes in the direction advocated by communication on a social issue at
times produce shifts in the direction opposite to that intended―the ‘boomerang effect.’”).
63. Stephen Worchel & Jack W. Brehm, Effect of Threats to Attitudinal Freedom as a
Function of Agreement with the Communicator, 14 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 18, 20-22
(1970).
64. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2263 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(sarcastically referring to language of a prior Justice O’Connor opinion as “eloquent[]” and then
using it against her vote in this case: “In any event, reliance upon ‘trends,’ even those of much
longer duration than a mere 14 years, is a perilous basis for constitutional adjudication, as
JUSTICE O’CONNOR eloquently explained in Thompson [v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988)]”); id.
at 2263 (“embarrassingly feeble evidence of ‛consensus’”); id. at 2259 (“Seldom has an opinion
of this Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its members.”);
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 637 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“JUSTICE
O’CONNOR would eliminate the windfall by giving the malefactor the benefit of its malefaction.
It is rather like eliminating the windfall that accrued to a purchaser who bought property at a
bargain rate from a thief clothed with the indicia of title, by making him turn over the ‘unjust’
profit to the thief.”); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 956 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I
cannot understand why those who acknowledge that, in the opening words of JUSTICE
O’CONNOR’s concurrence, ‘the issue of abortion is one of the most contentious and controversial
in contemporary American society,’ persist in the belief that this Court, armed with neither
constitutional text nor accepted tradition, can resolve that contention and controversy rather than
be consumed by it.”) (citation omitted); id. at 953 (“The notion that the Constitution of the United
States, designed, among other things, ‘to establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, . . . and
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity,’ prohibits the States from simply
banning this visibly brutal means of eliminating our half-born posterity is quite simply absurd.”)
(alteration in original); id. at 954-55 (“It is a value judgment, dependent upon how much one
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and criticism is often an essential part of sound decision-making over time. As
one of the “nine scorpions in the bottle”—Justice Holmes’ evocative
description of the life on the Supreme Court65—each Justice well appreciates
that public criticism is a normal part of the job, including criticism originating
from the written opinions of their colleagues on the bench. Even so, however,
Justice Scalia’s withering rhetoric is far more damning than the norm and
cannot fairly be expected to promote the formation of the kind of “dense bonds
of reciprocity” among the five more conservative Justices that Professor
Merrill envisions Scalia strategically to be fostering. Quite the opposite is the
far more likely result.66
By contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s style is far more likely to generate
cohesiveness and enduring majority coalitions. He writes matter-of-factly and
directly. There is little hyperbole and few gratuitous barbs. Moreover,
because the Chief, unlike Justice Scalia, regularly has responsibility for
delegating opinion assignments to his colleagues, he is far more ready to offer
the very kind of positive reciprocities—choice opinion writing assignments—
that can forge stronger working relationships.

respects (or believes society ought to respect) the life of a partially delivered fetus, and how much
one respects (or believes society ought to respect) the freedom of the woman who gave it life to
kill it. Evidently, the five Justices in today’s majority value the former less, or the latter more, (or
both), than the four of us in dissent. Case closed.”); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 638 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“hand wringing”); id. at 639 (“terminal silliness”); id. at 645 (“The
Court’s portrayal of Coloradans as a society fallen victim to pointless, hate-filled ‘gay-bashing’ is
so false as to be comical.”); id. at 652 (“When the Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to
be with the knights rather than the villeins—and more specifically with the Templars, reflecting
the views and values of the lawyer class from which the Court’s Members are drawn.”); Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 996 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The
Imperial Judiciary lives.”); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 876-77 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“I know of no authority whatever for our specifying the precise form that state
legislation must take, as opposed to its constitutionally required content. We have in the past
studiously avoided that sort of interference in the States’ legislative processes, the heart of their
sovereignty. . . . Thus, while the concurrence [by JUSTICE O’CONNOR] purports to be adopting an
approach more respectful of States’ rights than the plurality, in principle it seems to me much
more disdainful.”).
65. Richard A. Posner, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 104 HARV. L. REV. 13,
14 (1990).
66. This is not to suggest that the lack of enduring cohesiveness is necessarily a bad thing.
To the contrary, one reason why the Court may be less likely to reach extreme results over time is
that the structure of its decision making process, including the opportunity for open debate and
for heated criticism, makes less likely both enclave deliberation and, therefore, polarization in the
Court’s decisions. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110
YALE. L.J. 71, 85-89 (2000).
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V. CONCLUSION
Courts are regularly named after the Chief Justice that leads them. Hence,
in recent years, one hears of the “Warren Court,” “Burger Court,” and now the
“Rehnquist Court.” Quite often, those titles are misleading because the Chief
Justice may, in fact, play no dominating role in fashioning either the Court’s
agenda or resulting jurisprudence. While, as described above, I believe that the
thesis of Tom Merrill’s outstanding Childress Lecture is incorrect for several
reasons, the central reason lies in his under-appreciation that the current Court
warrants its label. This is, indeed, Rehnquist’s Court.
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